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THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER
FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS:
DEFINING EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY
THROUGH THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S
Cross-Section Requirement
Adam Lamparello* & Cynthia Swann**
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminat-
ing on the basis of race.”1
ABSTRACT
Skin color and diversity are not synonymous. Furthermore, race pro-
vides no basis upon which to stereotype individuals or groups, regardless
of whether the reasons are malevolent or benign.
Affirmative action policies in higher education should focus on the
things that individuals have overcome, not the traits that individuals—and
groups—cannot change. Currently, the opposite is true, as such policies
equate racial diversity with educational diversity, thus precluding sufficient
consideration of factors such as family and personal background, life expe-
rience, and the overcoming of adversity that would result in true educa-
tional diversity. This is not to say that race is irrelevant, as studies have
shown that race contributes in part to achieving a diverse student body. It is
to say that, by foreclosing a more searching review of every applicant’s
background, universities achieve, at best, an incomplete form of diversity
that undermines, rather than furthers, the goal of creating a diverse and
intellectually stimulating classroom environment.
This essay proposes that affirmative action programs should reflect a
more comprehensive and empirically-sound definition of diversity. To do
so, universities should adopt the framework created by the United States
Supreme Court when interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial re-
quirement. Specifically, the Court has held that defendants are entitled to a
jury that represents a cross-section of the community, although such cross-
sections need not mirror a community’s racial and ethnic composition. By
refusing to construe the cross-section requirement along racial and ethnic
* Associate Dean for Experiential Learning and Associate Professor of Law, Indi-
ana Tech Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
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lines, the Court has implicitly recognized that a cross-section of the com-
munity can be realized by considering individual factors, not immutable
characteristics.
Affirmative action policies that embrace the concepts underlying the
Court’s cross-section jurisprudence would achieve a more meaningful type
of educational diversity that reflects the various life experiences, adversities,
and backgrounds that shape an individual’s perspective and worldview.
This approach would also recognize that race is neither a proxy for diver-
sity nor a basis upon which to make judgments about individuals. Indeed,
until affirmative action programs employ more holistic and individualized
admissions practices, race and ethnicity will continue to be as prevalent in
modern society as they were during the Jim Crow era. Moreover, it should
not matter that, unlike Jim Crow laws, university admissions action policies
rely on race and ethnicity for “benign” purposes. The use of race, however
well-intentioned, ultimately precludes a truly individualized—and holis-
tic—consideration of applicants, and prevents universities from emphasiz-
ing the content of an individual’s character, rather than the color of an
individual’s skin.
INTRODUCTION
IN Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,2 (Fisher II) the SupremeCourt will decide the constitutionality of the University of Texas atAustin’s (University) affirmative action program, a decision that will
have ramifications for affirmative action programs nationwide.3 The Uni-
versity’s program strives to enroll a diverse student body by focusing dis-
proportionately on race and ethnicity. First, the University grants
automatic admission to high school students who graduate in the top ten
percent of their classes (Top Ten Program), which results in the admission
of a substantial number of African-American and Hispanic applicants.4
Second, the University employs a holistic review process for applicants
who are not admitted through the Top Ten Program, but possess other
qualities (e.g., work experience, community service, socio-economic sta-
tus) that warrant admission.5
2. 135 S. Ct. 2888 (Mem) (2015).
3. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (Fisher I).
In Fisher I, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upholding the University’s program on the ground that the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not properly apply strict scrutiny. On remand, the Fifth Circuit again upheld the
program and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari to consider the program’s consti-
tutionality. See id.
4. See Fisher v. University of Texas, 758 F.3d 633, 650–51 (noting that the “Top Ten
Percent Plan gains diversity from . . . [t]he de facto segregation of schools in Texas [and]
enables the Top Ten Percent Plan to increase minorities in the mix”). The University also
uses an Academic Index to admit applicants who are not in the top ten percent of their
high school classes, but who possess extremely high SAT scores and grade point averages.
Id. at 638.
5. See id. at 638.
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However, approximately ten years ago, the University included race as
a factor in its “holistic review” process to ensure the “dispersion of mi-
nority students among many classes and programs,”6 and for the purpose
of obtaining “qualitative diversity.”7 The University’s justifications high-
light the defects in many affirmative action programs, as these programs
place excessive emphasis on enrolling a specific number or “critical mass”
of minority applicants to achieve educational diversity. As discussed be-
low, such programs  rest on invidious stereotypes about applicants based
on skin color and ethnicity, and these stereotypes harm, rather than help,
minority applicants.
Part of the problem is that, rather than striving to achieve educational
diversity, the University’s affirmative action seeks to remedy past dis-
crimination against minority groups, which the Court has repeatedly dis-
allowed in the affirmative action context.8 This approach perpetuates a
cultural attitude that equates applicants’ race with his or her identity and
fosters a climate that elevates immutable characteristics above individual
accomplishments. For these and other reasons, the Supreme Court will
likely hold that the University’s affirmative action program is not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve educational diversity,9 and in so doing, the
Court will lay the foundation for a new type of affirmative action in
higher education that enrolls a truly diverse student body and enhances
the educational experience for students of all backgrounds. In short, al-
though race should still be considered in the admissions process, it should
be one part of a broader—and more individualized—consideration of
applicants.
More specifically, race-conscious admissions policies in a post-Fisher
world should be based on the Sixth Amendment’s cross-section require-
ment, which entitles a defendant to a jury representing a cross-section of
the community.10 When applying the cross-section requirement, the Su-
preme Court has expressly rejected the notion that a jury must mirror the
racial and ethnic demographics of a particular community.11 In doing so,
the Court has implicitly recognized that a true cross-section of the com-
munity can be—and is—realized through an individualized consideration
6. Id. at 658.
7. Id. at 667; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (upholding the
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program and stating that universi-
ties may seek to enroll a “critical mass” of minority students).
8. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (“Redressing past discrimination could not serve as
a compelling interest, because a university’s ‘broad mission [of] education’ is incompatible
with making the ‘judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statu-
tory violations necessary to justify remedial racial classification.’”) (quoting Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–09 (1978). In Bakke, the Court upheld
the University of California’s affirmative action program on the ground that the interest in
achieving a diverse student body was sufficiently compelling to justify the use of race as
one factor in the admissions process).
9. See Fisher, 758 F.3d at 664 (Garza, J., dissenting) (the inclusion of race must be
“necessary and narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest [achieving
educational diversity]”).
10. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
11. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1990).
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of potential jurors that transcends race and ethnicity. Affirmative action
programs in higher education do the opposite because such programs
equate race and ethnicity with educational diversity. As a result, universi-
ties ignore, or do not sufficiently emphasize, characteristics such as family
upbringing, geography, socio-economic status, physical disability, and
mental illness that influence an individual’s perspective, values, and
worldview. Put simply, diversity is about so much more than the color of
an individual’s skin, and skin color alone reveals nothing about the con-
tent of one’s character. By weighing race so heavily, universities have in-
advertently made the educational environment less diverse and
perpetuated precisely what affirmative action programs strive to avoid:
stereotypes of individuals based on the traits they cannot change, rather
than the personal circumstances they have overcome.
Instead of engaging in impermissible racial balancing, universities
should strive to enroll a student body that reflects a true cross-section of
the community. Part II discusses Fisher II, where the Supreme Court will
decide the constitutionality of the University of Texas at Austin’s affirma-
tive action program. Part III argues that the University’s program is un-
constitutional, and that to achieve true educational diversity, universities
should design affirmative action programs using a framework analogous
to that created by the United States Supreme Court when interpreting
the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that juries represent a cross-section
of the community.12
PART II: RACE ALONE CANNOT ACHIEVE EDUCATIONAL
DIVERSITY
The University’s affirmative action program suffers from two fatal de-
fects that plague affirmative action programs across the country. First,
such programs conflate race with educational diversity, and second, they
lead to racial and ethnic stereotyping.
A. RACE SHOULD NOT BE A PROXY FOR DIVERSITY
In Fisher I, the Court relied on Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke13 to hold that educational diversity is the only interest sufficiently
compelling to justify the use of race in the admissions process.14 As the
Court held in Fisher I, “[r]edressing past discrimination could not serve as
a compelling interest because a university’s ‘broad mission [of] education’
is incompatible with making the ‘judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations necessary to justify reme-
dial racial classification.’”15
The University’s emphasis on race in the admissions process runs afoul
of Fisher I because it strives, at least in part, to remedy past discrimina-
12. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527.
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
15. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09).
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tion, not achieve educational diversity. Furthermore, the University’s af-
firmative action program includes a quantitative aspect that seeks
primarily to increase the number of minority admittees, not to enroll a
student body from a variety of, among other things, socio-economic, geo-
graphic, and familial backgrounds. Nowhere is this more evident than by
the University’s goal to ensure the “dispersion of minority students
among many classes and programs.”16 This justification places the Uni-
versity’s affirmative action program squarely at odds with Bakke, as it
fails to promote “values beyond race alone, including enhanced class-
room dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes.”17
Part of the problem can be traced to the Court’s decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger,18 where the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, veered away
from Bakke and upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s (Law
School) affirmative action program, even though the program conflated
educational diversity with redressing past discrimination and sought to
enroll a “critical mass” of minority applicants.19 Indeed, the Law School
acknowledged that the primary objective of its affirmative action pro-
gram was “one particular type of diversity,”20 namely, “racial and ethnic
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups
which have been historically discriminated against, like Afri-
can–Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this com-
mitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful
numbers.”21
This approach is problematic for a number of reasons, most notably
that it encompasses only a fraction of what properly constitutes diversity,
and cannot, by itself, achieve the benefits of educational diversity. In fact,
scholars have identified six constructs of diversity, of which race is merely
a part. They include the following:
Diversity of personal background. This includes “gender, race, geo-
graphic origin, marital status, religion and spirituality, education, work
experience and economic status.”22
Diversity of family background. This includes “demographic and social
factors such as family size, socio-economic status, culture, customs and
traditions that influence students’ perceptions and interpretations of
events in one’s life.”23
Diversity of experience. This refers to “positive and negative life exper-
iences that each student brings to the classroom and the campus. These
might include exposure to a variety of customs, cultures and perspectives
16. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 658 (emphasis added).
17. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (emphasis added).
18. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
19. See id. at 329–30.
20. Id. at 316 (internal quotations omitted).
21. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
22. Charles E. Daye, et al., Does Race Matter in Educational Diversity? A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 75-S, 95–96-S (2012).
23. Id.
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as well as experiences of prejudice and disadvantage that might influence
a student’s outlook on the social order.”24
Diversity of perspective. This “includes, among other things, differ-
ences in values, beliefs, conceptions of the world and political orientation.
It has been persuasively argued that a group of students whose members
hold different beliefs about what is important, worthy, beautiful and good
in life will be more likely to discover for themselves the depth and in-
terminability of the disputes in which human beings find themselves en-
tangled, than a group of students whose members share values that are
homogenous within the group.”25
Diversity of educational expectations. This “refers to predispositions
that students bring to both curricular interpretations and classroom inter-
actions. These predispositions will be manifested in rates of class partici-
pation, [how] assignments and class projects are prepared and presented,
and whether students participate in such study groups . . . and social
interactions.”26
Diversity of career goals and aspirations. This “ties differences in rea-
sons for pursuing higher education to different foci that students bring to
issues. These items collect data about the ways students foresee that their
education will be beneficial to themselves or to their communities after
they leave the formal educational setting.”27
Furthermore, empirical data suggests that “students’ personal back-
ground and family background will influence the students’ exper-
iences,”28 which in turn affects students’ perspectives and “influence
expectations for the educational setting.”29 Thus, a university that was
truly committed to, and mindful of, Bakke’s commitment to educational
diversity would incorporate the above constructs into its admissions
policy.
Of course, this is not to say that race and ethnicity are irrelevant. Em-
pirical data suggests that an individual’s racial and ethnic background is
“associated with differences of sociopolitical attitudes, experiences, dis-
crimination histories, behaviors during law school, and professional aspi-
rations. . . . matters to [achieving] educational diversity.”30 In fact,
without a racially diverse student body, “useful expressions of different
perspectives may be unavailable with consequent loss of insight, richness,
and understanding.”31
For these reasons, a racially diverse student body, while necessary, is
not sufficient to enroll a  diverse student body, or to achieve the benefits




27. Daye, supra, note 22, at 95-96-S.
28. Id. at 99-S.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 188-S
31. Id. at 189-S.
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cohort of students of color as presenting a satisfactory diversity of back-
ground, experiences, family circumstances, perspective and expectations
is very likely to miss significant aspects of educational diversity.”32 In ad-
dition, African-American students “do not always share the same per-
spectives . . . as other students of color,”33 thus making it inadvisable to
make assumptions about an applicant’s beliefs based solely on the color
of his or her skin. Perhaps most importantly, as the Supreme Court has
recognized,  “[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm,”34 and “[u]nless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings,
they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility.”35
At bottom, by adopting a narrow, race-based definition of diversity,
universities fail to create educational diversity in a complete or even
meaningful sense. In Grutter, for example, the Law School defined diver-
sity almost exclusively along racial lines, yet simultaneously claimed that
its affirmative action program achieved “that diversity which has the po-
tential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class
stronger than the sum of its parts.”36 But how can the Law School claim
that it is achieving educational diversity when several categories compris-
ing diversity itself are given little, if any, weight? Of course, the Law
School tried to comport its program to Bakke by arguing that diversity is
not defined “solely in terms of racial and ethnic status.”37 Yet, given the
stated goal of its program, it is highly likely that this statement paid mere
lip service to the notion that diversity is comprised of factors other than
race. This is particularly true given the Law School’s concession that the
color of an applicant’s skin was “an extremely strong factor in the deci-
sion for acceptance,”38 and that minority applicants “are given an ex-
tremely large allowance for admission.”39
Unfortunately, when one considers that race in itself reveals little, if
anything, about an individual, it becomes clear that the Law School’s fo-
cus on race precludes the type of individualized consideration of appli-
cants that would result in truly diverse student body. For example, a
white female from the Bronx, New York, a neighborhood overridden
with poverty, would almost certainly offer unique perspectives that an
African-American male from Beverly Hills, California would not. In
other words, race, when divorced from an individual’s personal exper-
iences, provides little insight into whether an individual will offer per-
spectives that enhance the diversity of a student body.  As such, how can
32. Id. at 188-S.
33. Daye, supra, note 22, at 188-S.
34. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
35. Id.
36. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
37. Id. at 316.
38. Id. at 320 (internal quotations omitted).
39. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the University claim that its goal is educational diversity when the basis
for achieving that diversity is primarily skin color?
The short answer is that it cannot, unless the Court in Fisher II holds
that the goal of affirmative action in higher education is “to assure within
its student body some specified percentage of a particular group, merely
because of its race or ethnic origin.”40 Given the language in Bakke and
the criticism that has persisted in Grutter’s wake, the Court will likely
decline to do so. After all, if the unspoken goal of affirmative action pro-
grams is to cultivate a society that looks beyond skin color, it is difficult to
achieve that goal when the focus is on skin color. As Chief Justice Rob-
erts stated in Seattle School District No. 1, “[t]he way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”41
Ultimately, by upholding the Law School’s affirmative action program,
the Grutter Court disregarded Justice Powell’s admonition in Bakke that
diversity encompasses “a far broader array of qualifications and charac-
teristics of which racial or ethnic origin is, but a single though important
element.”42 The Law School’s program embraced, rather than eschewed,
“an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of
the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic
groups.”43 In doing so, the Law School  ignored the fact that Justice Pow-
ell explicitly rejected  the goal  of “‘reducing the historic deficit of tradi-
tionally disfavored minorities’ . . . as an unlawful interest in racial
balancing,”44 and in “remedying societal discrimination, because such
measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third par-
ties ‘who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
special admissions program are thought to have suffered.’”45 Thus, if edu-
cational diversity—not remedying past discrimination—is the only per-
missible goal of affirmative action programs, how can the Law School’s
program, along with other race-conscious affirmative action programs, be
justified?46 Again, the short answer, and the one most likely to come
from the Supreme Court in Fisher II, is that it cannot. At bottom, the
Court’s decision in Grutter ensured that future litigation would be fo-
cused on the extent to which race is permissible in the admissions process,
not on whether such a process results in a truly diverse incoming class and
therefore achieves the benefits of educational diversity.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
41. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 748.
42. Id. at 315; see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40.
43. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
44. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306) (internal quotations
omitted).
45. Id. at 323–24 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310).
46. Id.
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B. THE UNIVERSITY’S RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICY:
PERPETUATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC STEREOTYPING
The disproportionate use of race in affirmative action, whether con-
sciously or not, fosters an attitude that views and judges individuals based
on unchangeable characteristics rather than the unique aspects of an indi-
vidual’s character and background. Inevitably, this leads to impermissible
stereotyping and assumptions of applicants based on their skin color.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the University’s affirmative ac-
tion program. Indeed, in arguments before the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the University argued that the inclusion of race in holistic review is
necessary because the minority applicants admitted through the Top Ten
Percent Program that graduate from largely segregated high schools in
poor communities are not as qualified as those who graduate from
predominantly white high schools in affluent neighborhoods.47
This objective rests on a qualitative assumption that minority appli-
cants admitted through the Top Ten Percent Program “are somehow
more homogenous, less dynamic and more undesirably stereotypical than
those admitted under holistic review.”48 Even worse, the Fifth Circuit’s
acceptance of the University’s argument was “premised on the dangerous
assumption, that students from those districts (at least those in the top ten
percent of each class) do not possess the qualities necessary for the Uni-
versity of Texas to establish meaningful campus diversity.”49
In essence, the University’s affirmative action program, which like
many others is laden with the very stereotypes of minority applicants that
haunted the Jim Crow era, “promote[s] notions of racial inferiority[,] . . .
lead[s] to a politics of racial hostility,”50 and “embrace[s] the very ill that
the Equal Protection Clause seeks to banish.”51 Simply put, the Univer-
sity’s blatant stereotyping of minorities who graduate from segregated
schools fails to recognize that race “is only one element in a range of
factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heter-
ogeneous student body,”52 and that diversity encompasses “a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is, but a single though important element.”53 In Grutter, for example, the
Petitioner highlighted the evils that result when universities rely on skin
color as a proxy for diversity:
The way in which the [University of Michigan] Law School defines
its interest in diversity proves how it is tied to crude stereotypes. It
deems that mere membership in one of the specified racial or ethnic
47. Fisher, 738 F.3d. at 669–70 (Garza, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 670.
49. Id.; see also J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (holding that unless classifications based
on race are “strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility”).
50. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
51. Fisher, 738 F.3d at 670.
52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
53. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
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groups will make it “particularly likely” that students will have had
“experiences and perspectives of special importance” to the Law
School’s “mission.” Thus, the Law School “impermissibly value[s] in-
dividuals because [it] presume[s] that persons think in a manner as-
sociated with their race.” The “corollary to this notion is plain:
Individuals of unfavored racial and ethnic backgrounds are unlikely
to possess the unique experiences and background that contribute to
viewpoint diversity.”54
 Perhaps most importantly, the University’s affirmative program is predi-
cated largely on “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry,”55 which are “by their very nature odious to a free people.”56
Moreover, if, as the University argues, its holistic review process “al-
lows it to select for ‘other types of diversity’ beyond race alone,”57 what
possible justification supports including race as a factor, particularly when
the University admits a substantial number of minority applicants
through its Top Ten Percent Program? The belief, without a shred of sup-
porting evidence, is that minorities from segregated schools are not as
qualified as those attending predominantly white high schools and living
in affluent neighborhoods. Even the most ardent supporters of affirma-
tive action would not countenance such a blatant example of masking
racial and ethnic stereotyping with “benign” motives.58 This is precisely
why racial classifications are “too pernicious to permit any but the most
54. Grutter v. Bollinger, Petitioner’s Brief 38 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v.
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 618–19 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
55. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (quoting Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943)); cf. U.S. v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515, 533, 541 (1996) (states may not enact laws
that rely on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or prefer-
ences of males and females,” particularly when the states control the “gates to opportu-
nity”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group”).
56. Rice, 528 U.S. at 517; see also Fisher, 738 F.3d at 669–70. In his dissent, Judge
Garza stated as follows:
The University has not shown that qualitative diversity is absent among the
minority students admitted under the race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law
[Program]. That is, the University does not evaluate the diversity present in
this group before deploying racial classifications to fill the remaining seats.
The University does not assess whether Top Ten Percent Law admittees ex-
hibit sufficient diversity within diversity, whether the requisite “change
agents” are among them, [or] whether these admittees are able, collectively
or individually, to combat pernicious stereotypes. There is no such evaluation
despite the fact that Top Ten Percent Law admittees also submit applications
with essays, and are even assigned PAI scores for purposes of admission to
individual schools. Id. at 669.
57. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 669 (Garza, J., dissenting).
58. The fact that such stereotypes are now used to include, rather than exclude, minor-
ities does not matter. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“[t]he analysis and level of scrutiny
applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the
objective appears acceptable”) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724, n. 9 (1982)); see also J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (“the analysis and level of
scrutiny applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply
because the objective appears acceptable”).
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exact connection between justification and classification.”59
Additionally, by equating race with diversity, universities give insuffi-
cient consideration to the many factors that shape an individual’s life and
inform their perspective. This includes family upbringing, military and
work experience, a history of overcoming adversity, physical and mental
disabilities, socio-economic status, and geography. Unfortunately, by nar-
rowly viewing diversity through the lens of race, affirmative action pro-
grams prohibit the type of inclusion that results from an admissions
process that looks beyond race and unchangeable characteristics. The
Court noted in Grutter, “classroom discussions . . . [are] simply more en-
lightening and interesting,” when students have “the greatest possible va-
riety of backgrounds.”60
At bottom, to hold that the University’s affirmative action program is
narrowly tailored would require the Court to countenance the stereotyp-
ing of African-American and Hispanic applicants based on their socio-
economic status, based on the fact that they graduated from segregated
schools, and based on the disadvantages they face due to past discrimina-
tion. This would make Brown v. Board of Education61 seem like an advi-
sory opinion, and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to stop
discriminating on the basis of race. Ultimately, by adopting the frame-
work used by the Court in the Sixth Amendment’s “cross-section” con-
text, universities can design affirmative action programs to further the
goal of enhancing educational diversity, while eschewing a disproportion-
ate emphasis on race and ethnicity.
PART III: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS SHOULD
STRIVE TO ACHIEVE A TRUE CROSS-SECTION OF
THE COMMUNITY
As the above discussion illustrates, current affirmative action programs
rest on fundamentally incompatible principles that frustrate, rather than
facilitate, the attainment of true educational diversity. The core problem
is that universities have largely disregarded the only permissible goal of
affirmative action programs—educational diversity62—in favor of reme-
dying past discrimination.63 In doing so, race and other immutable char-
acteristics have become proxies for a diverse student body at the expense
of the many factors that more directly influence an individual’s perspec-
59. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 720 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
270 (2003)) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
60. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (“the attainment of a diverse student body . . . is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education”).
63. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (“Redressing past discrimination could not serve as
a compelling interest, because a university’s ‘broad mission [of] education’ is incompatible
with making the ‘judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statu-
tory violations’ necessary to justify remedial racial classification.”) (quoting Bakke, 438
U.S. at 307–09).
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tives, like values and world view, that would enable that individual to
offer unique perspectives in the classroom.
Put differently, universities must consider the purpose of diversity
before they can design race-conscious admissions programs that will pro-
duce a  diverse student body. Indeed, meaningful classroom diversity en-
hances constructive dialogue between individuals to improve
understanding, elaborate on meaning, and effectuate individual and
group learning.64 As one scholar notes, dialogue “is much more than a
conversation,”65 as “understanding is dialogic because understanding is
by its nature responsive,”66 and “we elaborate meaning by ‘lay[ing] down
a set of our own answering words’ in response to the words of others.”67
Furthermore, dialogue fosters understanding when participants have an
“immense plurality of experience”68 that is “based upon, among many
other things, ‘parent, clan, class, religion [and] country.’”69 In this way, a
“complex array of sociological, ideological and historical factors deter-
mine the parameters of dialogue, and thus informs meaning.”70
Consequently, affirmative action programs that increase only one type
of diversity, whether racial, socio-economic, or geographic, fail to obtain
the necessary “plurality of experience” to enrich the learning environ-
ment.71 Additionally, when affirmative action programs strive to remedy
past discrimination, universities fail to meaningfully consider the charac-
teristics that develop classroom dialogue, and thereby fail to advance the
core purpose of attaining a diverse educational environment. As a result,
the unintended consequence of race-conscious affirmative action is that it
frustrates, rather than advances, the educational benefits of diversity be-
cause it leads to a student body that is diverse in only one respect. As
Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, affirmative action programs that fo-
cus “solely on ethnic diversity . . . hinder, rather than further attainment
of genuine diversity.”72
The logical choice, therefore, is to develop affirmative action programs
that encompass all six categories of diversity and eschew a disproportion-
64. See Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of
Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 7–8 (1996).
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting V.N. Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 102
(Ladislav Matjejka & I.R. Titunick trans., 1973)).
Given that understanding is dialogic, the elaboration of meaning is an extraordinarily
complex process. Any utterance comes from “another’s voice and filled with that other
voice,” and “enters [the hearer’s] context from another context, permeated with the inter-
pretations of others.” Stated another way, meaning “must find itself, reveal itself among
other words, within an intense field of interorientations.” Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. (quoting Wayne C. Booth, Introduction to Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dos-
toyevsky’s Poetics 26 (Caryl Emerson ed. & trans., 1984)).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id.
72. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
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ate emphasis on any single factor. An ideal way to design such a frame-
work is by analogy to the Supreme Court’s cross-section jurisprudence.
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
ENABLES UNIVERSITIES TO CONSIDER ALL SIX COMPONENTS
OF DIVERSITY WITHOUT EXCLUDING RACE
The Supreme Court’s cross-section jurisprudence provides a principled
framework to design affirmative action programs that attain true educa-
tional diversity. The Court has repeatedly held that the right to a “jury
trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity,”73 and not “the organ of any special group or class.”74 As the Court
has noted, “[i]t is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as
instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community.”75
Importantly, the Court has interpreted the cross-section requirement to
encompass primarily a negative right against the systematic exclusion of
jurors on the basis of race.76 In Lockhart v. McCree,77 the Court stated as
follows:
[T]he exclusion from jury service of large groups of individuals not
on the basis of their inability to serve as jurors, but on the basis of
some immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic back-
ground, undeniably gave rise to an “appearance of unfairness.” Fi-
nally, such exclusion improperly deprived members of these often
historically disadvantaged groups of their right as citizens to serve on
juries in criminal cases.78
A defendant alleging improper exclusion must demonstrate that: “(1)
the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive part of the community, (2)
the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community,79 and (3) the underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”80 In conducting this
analysis, courts may “infer that unconstitutional exclusion of cognizable
73. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
74. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
75. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
76. Id. (holding that excluding members of different racial groups from jury service is
“at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government”).
77. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
78. Id. at 175.
79. Regarding the second prong, courts often rely on the concept of absolute and com-
parative disparity. Absolute disparity “measures the difference between the percentage of
members of the distinctive group in the relevant population and the percentage of group
members on the jury wheel.” U.S. v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1999). Comparative
disparity “measures the diminished likelihood that members of an underrepresented
group, when compared to the population as a whole, will be called for jury service.” Id.
(quoting Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (3d Cir. 1992)). Most courts rely on
absolute rather than comparative disparity when determining if the cross-section require-
ment has been a violated. Id. at 7.
80. U.S. v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001).
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groups exists when there is a disparity between a group’s population
figures and its representation in the jury venire sufficiently large that it is
extremely unlikely that the disparity results from random chance.”81
However, the rule against improper exclusion does not entitle a defen-
dant to a racially diverse jury, but instead gives criminal defendants “a
fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity.”82 As discussed below, the Court’s interpretation of the cross-sec-
tion requirement implicitly recognizes that, at least in some
circumstances, a cross-section of the community can be reflected by char-
acteristics independent of race and ethnicity. The same should hold true
in the affirmative action context.
A. THE CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE
JURIES THAT MIRRORS A COMMUNITY’S RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHICS, OR THAT RACE SHOULD
BE A PRIMARY FACTOR IN SATISFYING
THIS REQUIREMENT.
The Supreme Court has held that the requirement of a fair cross-sec-
tion does not guarantee that juries be “of any particular composition,”83
or that venires be a substantially true “mirror” of the community.84 Ac-
cordingly, the cross-section requirement does not require that juries must
“mirror the community” and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population.85 Indeed, “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any par-
ticular composition,”86 and although “the right to a jury trial guarantees
the criminal defendant a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’
jurors, there is no requirement that a venire or jury mirror the general
population.”87 Thus, the negative right to improper exclusion is grounded
in a right to equal opportunity, not a requirement that outcomes reflect
every immutable characteristic of the community.
B. IN THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTEXT, THE CROSS-SECTION
REQUIREMENT CAN ACHIEVE EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY
WITHOUT PLACING DISPROPORTIONATE WEIGHT
ON RACE AND ETHNICITY
 In Grutter, the Court noted that “‘classroom discussion is livelier, more
spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students
have ‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’”88 A race-conscious
81. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231.
82. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
83. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
84. Id.
85. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, n.20 (1979); see also Lockhart, 476 U.S. at
173 (the Court has not required that petit juries ”reflect the composition of the community
at large”).
86. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990).
87. Phillips, 239 F.3d at 842 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).
88. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added).
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admissions policy that is analogous to the cross-section requirement
would result in a meaningfully diverse student body and enhance the edu-
cational experience for applicants of all races and ethnicities.
To begin with, the cross-section requirement facilitates a holistic view
of diversity. By not mandating that juries mirror the racial and ethnic
demographics of a community, the Court implicitly recognizes that char-
acteristics beyond race and ethnicity are vital to empaneling juries that
reflect a cross-section of the community.89At the same time, the Court’s
prohibition on the improper exclusion of jurors and, more particularly,
the permissibility of inferring improper exclusion based on a significant
“disparity between a group’s population figures and its representation in
the jury venire,”90 reflects an understanding that race and ethnicity are
components of a meaningful cross-section of the community. Thus, where
a community is racially and ethnically diverse, members of each group
should ordinarily be represented in the jury pool. However, because the
cross-section requirement does not mandate that juries actually mirror a
community’s racial and ethnic demographics, it avoids the quantitative
approach to diversity that Grutter’s “critical mass” standard creates.91 In
doing so, the cross-section requirement facilitates a consideration of fac-
tors such as personal and family background, life experience, political
views, values, and perspectives, and thus embraces a more holistic view of
diversity.92
C. THE VOIR DIRE OF ADMISSIONS: CREATING A DIVERSITY
QUESTIONNAIRE
Universities can—and should—embrace a holistic approach to diver-
sity by first eliminating the portion of every application that simply re-
quires candidates to check boxes that reveal skin color or ethnicity.
Instead, applications should contain a diversity questionnaire that probes,
among other things, an individual’s background, family circumstances,
the overcoming of adversity, and life experiences. This approach will en-
able schools to more fully evaluate candidates based not on the color of
their skin, but on the content of their character, and will allow schools to
reward individuals for what they have overcome, not for what they can-
not change. In short, the goal of enrolling a diverse student body should
be achieved through a process that is as noble as the end it seeks. That
process should embrace the principle that all people should be treated
equally.
Most importantly, a diversity questionnaire will allow admissions offi-
cials to conduct an individualized consideration of each applicant, admit a
diverse student body, and create a classroom environment that will enrich
the educational experience for students of all backgrounds. Below is a
89. Holland, 493 U.S. at 483.
90. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231.
91. Fisher I, 539 U.S. at 340.
92. See id. at 338.
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non-exhaustive list of questions that might be included in a diversity
questionnaire. Questions like those below would identify the life exper-
iences, challenges, and environmental factors that shaped the candidates’
perspectives and will enable them to enrich the classroom environment.
1. Please describe a significant life experience that impacted your
values and influenced your life and career choices.
2. Please explain how your background and life experiences includ-
ing, but not limited to, race, ethnicity, disability, socioeconomic
status, family and background, have prepared you to contribute
diverse perspectives to the classroom environment.
3. Please identify a life experience in which you overcame signifi-
cant adversity, and explain how you reflected upon and grew
from that experience.
4. Identify a conflict that you have had with a friend, family mem-
ber, or colleague, and explain how you resolved this conflict.
5. Please describe your experiences with individuals of diverse
backgrounds that offered perspectives different than yours.
Please include in your answer how you reacted to this experi-
ence, what you learned, and how it contributed to your growth as
a person.
6. Identify what you would consider a mistake or lapse in judgment
in your life, and describe how you reflected upon and learned
from that event.
7. Have you ever been subject to discrimination on the basis of,
among other things, your race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, or religious background? If so, explain how this experience
impacted you as a person and influenced your conduct toward
individuals of different backgrounds.
8. Do you believe diversity is an important educational objective?
Why or why not?
9. How would you define “diversity,” and in your view what factors
are essential to creating a diverse and stimulating classroom
environment?
The table below summarizes the connection between the jury and ap-
plicant selection process and sets forth the process by which a diverse jury
and educational environment are achieved.
Group Method of Selection Outcome
Jury Pool Voir Dire A cross-section of the community, but
the jury need not reflect the racial and
ethnic demographics of the commu-
nity (“Jury diversity”)
Applicant Pool Diversity Questionnaire A diverse student body that reflects a
cross-section of the community that is
based on factors beyond race and
ethnicity alone
(“Educational diversity”) 
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CONCLUSION
 Affirmative action programs will likely never gain widespread accept-
ance because the use of race, whether for prejudicial or preferential pur-
poses, is fundamentally at odds with principles of equality and fairness.
This is particularly true where affirmative action programs strive to rem-
edy past discrimination, not create a truly diverse educational environ-
ment where the classroom reflects cross-section of the community.
Ironically, such policies harm students they are intended to benefit and
those, like Abigail Fisher, who claim that they result in cognizable legal
harm. For example, the University of Texas justified its affirmative action
program by assuming that African-American and Hispanic applicants
from segregated schools and poor neighborhoods were inferior. That as-
sumption bears a striking resemblance to the beliefs that fueled “separate
but equal,” and the prejudice that prompted former Governor George
Wallace to proudly declare “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, and
segregation forever.”93
Individuals of all races should be offended when judgments are driven
by skin color, regardless of whether the reasons are grounded in disap-
proval and discrimination or acceptance and advancement. At bottom,
affirmative action programs lead, at least in some cases, to the admission
or denial of applicants based primarily on their skin color. Those who
might disagree need only look to the University of Michigan Law
School’s statement that minority status is “an extremely strong factor in
the decision for acceptance.”94
Sadly, whatever benefit might result from race-based affirmative action
likely pales in comparison to the cost to all students of all races: a less
educationally diverse classroom and a message that the color of an appli-
cant’s skin matters more than the content of an applicant’s character. In
Fisher II, the Supreme Court will likely invalidate the University’s affirm-
ative action program and will thus send a different message: “the way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”95 If that happens, an honest and inclusive march to equal-
ity can finally begin.
93. Howell Raines, George Wallace, Segregation Symbol, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
14, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/14/us/george-wallace-segregation-symbol-dies-
at-79.html?pagewanted=all.
94. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320.
95. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 748.
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